During an infection outbreak, many people continue to revisit Ground Zero --such as the one square mile of Miami involved in the current Zika outbreak -for work, family or social reasons. Public health planning must account for the counterintuitive ways in which this human flow affects the outbreak's duration, severity and time-to-peak. Managing this flow of revisits can allow the outbreak's evolution to be tailored.
In addition to sparking the first ever U.S. government health warning for travel within the continental United States, the current Zika outbreak is remarkable for the geographical precision with which Ground Zero is specified: one square mile within the popular Wynwood arts and dining area (Fig. 1A) (1,2). While tourists from afar may be scared off from ever visiting, many locals will repeatedly enter and leave this urban Ground Zero throughout the outbreak. From a pure numbers perspective, the 'best' strategy for containment would be to quarantine the Ground Zero area, allowing no flow of people through it. However this is completely impractical given that popular places such as Wynwood need a flux of people in order to survive economically and to function socially. An additional complication is that schoolchildren will soon be moving through Wynwood following the summer recess, and worried parents are increasingly looking to officials for guidance. However apart from the obvious advice about restricting mosquito bites while inside Ground Zero, what policy advice should be issued relating to human flow?
An accurate answer to this question lies beyond any existing contagion model, meaning that there can be no precise policy advice concerning human flow through Ground Zero. However there is another option: Researchers can plug order-of-magnitude parameters specific to Wynwood into the plethora of existing contagion models that mimic revisit dynamics. In particular, many recent works in the complex systems and networks field consider the process of contagion in tandem with links between individuals being broken or formed in time (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) . Figure 1 shows what can be achieved by doing this, using the model from Refs. 11 and 12 as an example (see Fig. 1A ). We identify two possible transmission mechanisms: (1) Person-to-person transmission due to direct interaction between an infected individual and a susceptible individual within Ground Zero, either through physical (e.g. sexual) contact or mediated by the same infected mosquito and (2) Endemic background transmission due to a population of infected mosquitoes within Ground Zero. Current estimates are that roughly 1% of the mosquito population on average carries Zika within Wynwood, however our conclusions are robust to this estimate of parameters. It is mechanism (2), i.e. endemic background transmission, which is thought to be most relevant to Wynwood.
Despite the simplicity, the output from these order-of-magnitude calculations has several highly counterintuitive policy implications that are robust to variations in the values chosen. Panel B shows results for fixed average occupancy of Ground Zero as a function of the flow in and out. As the flow increases, the duration of the outbreak can be seen to decrease for both mechanisms. The severity (peak number of cases) increases with flow for the person-to-person transmission --however for the endemic background transmission relevant to Wynwood, the severity hardly changes despite the flow changing more than tenfold. Therefore in future outbreak scenarios for which mechanism (2) dominates, resources should not be wasted in curtailing Ground Zero revisit activity. The bottom panels in Fig. 1B show that for both mechanisms, increasing the flow initially increases the time-topeak of the infection, hence potentially delaying the worst moment of the outbreak for long enough to introduce additional spraying --or ultimately vaccinations when available. For even higher flows, the time-to-peak starts to decrease. The underlying reason for these counterintuitive effects is the implicit competition between high flow sweeping frequent visitors out before too many have become infected, and high flow allowing individuals who are still infected to enter again (e.g., locals). Figure 1C illustrates the outbreak severity for a broad range of recovery rates . Although is the average rate at which an infected individual ceases to be infectious, and hence should in principle be known, the Zika virus (and others) is still not well understood. Hence the actual time during which individuals remain infectious (∝ 1⁄ ) may be either higher or lower than presently estimated. The severity for the Zika case in Wynwood (Fig. 1B middle panels) resembles the lower panel in Fig. 1C (i.e., ≪ 6.7 ) since = 2.9 . As can be seen going from top to bottom panels in Fig. 1C , there is a remarkable switch in the dependency of the outbreak severity on increasing flow through Ground Zero. For a fast recovery rate (top panel) the severity decreases with increasing flow because the chance of individuals still being infectious when they revisit is now small. By contrast for a slow recovery rate (bottom panel) the severity increases with increasing flow because many individuals will still be infectious when they revisit. In between, there is a critical value (middle panel) for which the severity increases in a non-monotonic way with increasing flow.
As stated succinctly by the authors of Ref. 13 , policy-makers have to make decisions in the presence of enormous uncertainty and it is natural to reach for policies that mirror those used previously. However Fig. 1 warns that urban Ground Zero policies need updating to incorporate the unavoidable flow of local residents. We stress that although the inputs in Fig. 1B are appropriate to Wynwood, the trends shown in Figs. 1B and C will be valid for many other viruses and parasite-borne diseases (14) , and many other residential Ground Zeros, e.g. the highly vegetated and hence mosquito rich residential area of Pinecrest which is about ten miles south. Since Pinecrest does not have such an active art, restaurant and other outdoor scene as Wynwood, opportunities for mosquitoes biting humans must be relatively low. Also, homes at Pinecrest tend to be bigger, hence the flow and occupancy are reduced in the model by choosing a lower value for the total number of active individuals , and possibly also reducing the probabilities that a potential visitor outside (or inside) enters (or leaves) given by (or ). This could explain why local cases appear in Wynwood and not in other parts of the city. Finally, since such popular places exist on all geographic scales and yet the total flow and occupancy in Fig. 1 scale directly with , the same results apply in principle whether Ground Zero is an entire county, a city, a neighborhood, or an airport, hospital or school. (11, 12) . Arrows indicate potential visitors to Ground Zero (including commuters and returning residents) entering at timestep in the model with probability and leaving at timestep with probability . Their total number is . In the steady state at each timestep , the flow through Ground Zero (i.e. total number of individuals entering and leaving) is flow where flow = 2 � + �. ⁄ Hence the turnover of individuals within Ground Zero is dictated by flow for any . There are occup individuals inside Ground Zero who are potentially exposed to infection, where occup = � + � ⁄ for any . Infection rate for a susceptible individual (S) within Ground Zero is ; individual recovery rate for an infected individual (I) is . Here for convenience we take one timestep as one hour, and consider there to be on average 10 hours per day where there is flow of individuals in and out of Ground Zero, though this can easily be generalized. B: Duration, severity and time-to-peak of an outbreak, as predicted by the model in A. Left panel shows contours for person-to-person transmission; right panel is for endemic background transmission due, for example, to a population of infected mosquitos within Ground Zero. Estimating the recovery rate from infectious (I) to recovered (R) as approximately one week gives = 0.0143. Pink window denotes the region relevant to the current outbreak; the estimated infection rate is given by the probability of being bitten by an infected mosquito during timestep , which is (probability of being bitten by any mosquito) x (probability of a mosquito carrying the virus) = 0.5 x 0.01=0.005. The horizontal range shows our estimate of the flow range of interest, which ranges from one ( flow = 0.001; left side of pink window) to one hundred individuals per timestep ( flow = 0.1), i.e. during one day the horizontal range corresponds to 10 to 1000 individuals moving through ground zero. 
